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There is wide variation in the performance of NHS trusts. To tackle this, the government introduced a 
performance rating system, which summarises the overall performance of trusts against a number of 
targets.   The system places all non-specialist hospital trusts in England in one of four categories 
ranging from three to zero stars.   On inspection of the variation in the performance rating across 
hospitals an interesting puzzle emerges.  There is a clear regional pattern to the ratings whereby 
hospitals in the North of England, on average, perform better than hospitals in the South (see Table 1).   
 
This paper focuses on the labour market as a possible explanation. Regional pay differences are 
considerable.
1 Further, the pay distribution in the public sector is more compressed that that of the 
private sector, both within and between educational groups, indicating that high quality individuals get 
higher returns in the private sector.
2 This means that in some areas public sector employers are at a 
considerable disadvantage, relative to both private sector employers and their public sector counterparts 
in other parts of the country in terms of hiring and retention of staff. Low relative pay leads to two 
possible shortages, a lack of staff and of quality. It can cause problems in hiring and retention.  There is 
evidence for men that falling public sector relative wages have led to a decline in the quality of the 
public sector workforce.
3   
 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that the pattern in the performance ratings of NHS hospitals is 
driven by differences in relative earnings. Specifically, it examines the relationship between relative 
pay in the public and private sector for a key group of hospital staff - female nurses - and the star 
ratings and the individual components of those ratings.   
 
Data and Methods  
 
The first set of star ratings was published in September 2001.
4  These assessed hospitals on their 
performance over 2000/01. The overall ratings were based on 21 targets split into four groups:  9 key 
targets, 4 performance targets, 3 clinical targets, and 5 staff targets.  The key targets are the most 
significant factors in determining the overall performance rating.   Key targets include measures of 
hospital cleanliness, financial performance and key waiting time targets.    Performance targets include 
other waiting time targets and resolution of written complaints. Clinical targets include mortality and 
readmission rates and a measure of clinical negligence. The staff targets include measures such as 
retention of staff and sickness/absence rates. The second set of performance ratings were published in 
July 2002 and assessed hospitals based on their performance over 2001/02.
5 There were 37 targets: an 
expanded set of performance and clinical targets and targets based on inpatient surveys.   
   3 
Factors that may drive the ratings 
 
This paper examines the hypothesis that the star ratings are a function of the relative pay of nursing 
staff. We examine not absolute pay, but nurses’ pay relative to what an individual who is a nurse would 
get were she to take alternative employment in her area in the private sector. Absolute pay in both 
public and private sectors is highest in London and the South East.
6 But what matters to an individual 
living in an area choosing between different employers is the differential between them.. We 
hypothesise that the private-public pay ratio will exert a significant negative influence on trust 
performance.  The higher the ratio, the more attractive the alternatives to working as a nurse, and the 
lower the quantity and quality of the staff available to the trust.  
 
We control for other factors that may explain the star ratings. We allow for variation in need, the 
resources available to the trust, and for various fixed characteristics of the trust. If those admitted to 
hospital are sicker in a given area then the trusts in that area might be poorer performers (at least on 
some components of the star ratings). Hospitals with more resources should perform better, all other 
things being equal.  The size and teaching status of the trust are included to allow for the fact that 
volume and case mix may affect outcomes. 
  
We might not expect a clear relationship between the pay ratio and the overall star rating due to the 
nature of the calculation of the overall star rating.    In both years the star rating is made up of a number 
of individual targets carrying differing weights and these were not necessarily known in advance.  In 
this situation, managers are more likely to focus on individual targets rather than the overall rating, as 
they can affect the former more easily than the latter.
7,8,9 Further, some targets will have a closer 
relationship with nurses’ pay and quality than others. We therefore also examine each target separately.  
 
Construction of the measures of the factors  
 
To construct the pay ratio for each local labour market, we used data from a large national sample (the 
quarterly and annual Labour Force Surveys (LFS)
10) on the pay of nurses and the pay of individuals 
with similar qualifications to nurses in the private sector for the year 1999. The pay of nurses varies 
only regionally (there is one value for London and one for outside London). The pay of individuals in 
the private sector varies at local level: we aggregated private pay to county/unitary authority level.  
From these data we formed the ratio of private sector to nurses pay. This varies by country/unitary 
authority. The pay ratio was matched to each trust in the sample by means of postcode.   Details of the 
construction methodology for the pay variable are given in the Appendix.  
 
As a measure of population need we use standardised mortality ratios (SMRs) at health authority level 
for the years 1999 (Office of National Statistics). We report results using female over- and under-75 
SMRs. (These are highly correlated with male SMRs). As a robustness check, we also used 1998 SMRs 
and 1991 ward-level census data on the percentage of people with long-term limiting illness and the   4 
proportion of households that are owner occupiers (Office of National Statistics 1991 Census). The 
results were very similar.  
 
To control for the possible impact on the ratings of the resources of the hospital, its size and teaching 
status we use data on all hospital admissions from Hospital Episode Statistics, data on hospital staffing 
(Department of Health census of medical and dental workforce), income (from TAC05 returns, 
Department of Health), average daily numbers of available beds (occupied and unoccupied; from 
KH03 returns) and whether the hospital was a teaching (university) hospital according to a 
classification from the Department of Health. All these variables are for 1999. We divide total 
resources by admissions to give a measure of resources per patient, which is independent of size. (We 
also controlled for the pressure a hospital is under, using the number of hospital admissions per doctor 
but this was never significant and was omitted from the analysis).  We measure hospital size by number 
of beds, though this could be measured in a  number of other ways including the total number of 
admissions to hospital and the number of doctors.   Our analyses using these alternative measures 




We explain differences in overall star ratings for both 2000/1 (the September 2001 ratings) and 2001/2 
(the July 2002 star ratings).   The dependent variable is an ordinal variable (the star rating) that takes 
the values 0, 1, 2 or 3, 3 being the best possible outcome.   We then run regressions of performance 
against each individual target.   For each target hospitals are recorded as having either achieved, under-
achieved or significantly underachieved.   These are coded as 3, 2 and 1 respectively so that large 
values correspond to better outcomes.  For some of these targets there is limited variation in outcomes 
across trusts and in these cases the dependent variable was collapsed into two and probit analysis was 
used. For a small number of the targets the amount of variation was so limited (at least 95 percent of 
hospitals hit the target) that analyses were not undertaken using these measures. Those omitted are 2 of 
the 21 September 2001 targets and 2 of the 37 July 2002 targets). 
 
The independent variables are the pay ratio, under- and over-75 female SMRs, total hospital income 
from activities divided by total admissions, whether the trust is a teaching hospital, and the number of 
available beds.   
 
173 acute trusts were performance rated in Sept 2001. After elimination of observations due to missing 
data our sample for the 2001 ratings is 148. The comparable figures for 2002 are 166 (20 specialist 
trusts were also rated) and 151. 





Table 1 presents the average star rating by local government region. There is a North-South divide, but 
the performance of the South West suggests that there is more than a North South split.  Graph 1 shows 
the female all-age standardised mortality ratio (SMR).  Broadly, this falls from north to south. Thus the 
regional pattern in star ratings cannot be a function of population ill health as areas with worst health 
have better star ratings.  Graph 2 presents the 1999 pay ratio by region. The graph is ordered by lowest 
to highest region. The “private sector premium” is clearly highest in London and the South East, and 
lowest in the North of England. Graphs 3a and 3b plot the pay ratio against the star ratios for 2001 and 
2002. Broadly, star ratings are higher in areas with lower private sector premia and lower in areas with 
higher premia. 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the overall star rating. The dependent variable is the 2001 
rating in column (1) and the 2002 rating in column (2). The table shows no clear association between 
either the pay gap and the ratings or any of the other possible explanatory factors. Overall, these factors 
explain little of the variation in the star ratings.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of the same regression for each 2001 target separately. The table presents 
only the coefficient on the pay variable. Table 4 is the comparable results for the 2002 targets. For the 
2001 targets, the pay variable is significantly associated in the expected negative direction with 7 of the 
21 targets. Four are key targets - the total number of patients waiting for an inpatient appointment, 
reduction in outpatient waiting, trolley waiting and hospital cleanliness; one is a clinical target - level 
of compliance achieved against CNST risk management; one is a performance target - percentage of 
patients waiting less than 6 months for an inpatient appointment; one is a staff target – vacancy rate for 
qualified nursing, midwifery and health visiting staff (3 month vacancy rate). The pay variable is 
significantly positively associated with only one target - compliance with the new deal on junior 
doctors hours.  
 
For the 2002 targets, the pay variable is negatively and significantly associated with 11 out of the 37 
targets. 10 of these are performance targets, 6 of which are based on inpatient surveys. There are 2 
targets that have a significant positive association with the pay ratio. Both are staffing targets: the 
amount of time lost through absences as a percentage of staff time available for directly employed NHS 
staff; and responses from NHS-employed staff opinion survey on satisfaction with employer. In 
summary, across the 2 years, over one third of the analysed targets (18 out of 53) are negatively 
associated with the pay ratio. Only 3 are positively associated.  The results are robust to the data checks 
noted above and to omission of three trusts in the London/South East area that had private sector 
premia more than one standard error below the mean).   6 
 
None of the other controls used in the analysis had as strong and consistent association with achieving 
the targets as the pay ratio. (These results are available from the authors.) Financial resources per head 
(income/admission) are negatively associated with three 2001 targets, positively associated with five 
2002 targets and negatively associated with four 2002 targets. Our prior would be a positive or zero 
association while the bulk of the significant associations were negative: more money per head appears 
associated with less likelihood of scoring well on target. The ill health of the population (female SMR 
under- and over-75) is not associated in a clear direction with the targets. The bulk of the associations 
change sign between the two years. In 2001 there is a significant positive association with three targets 
and a significant negative association with 6, while the comparable figures for the 2002 targets are 11 
and 4. Across targets and years, the bulk of the significant associations for the marker of need are 
positive and of the a priori incorrect sign: trusts which have populations in poorer health do better in 
terms of meeting targets.  
 
The teaching status of the trust appears to have little association with hitting targets. Across the two 
years two targets were positively associated and five negatively. There appears to be more of a 
relationship with size: across the two years there were 8 negative associations and only 2 positive 




Despite the considerable media attention given to the star ratings, there has been little attempt to 
explain them. A recent commentary by the Commission for Health Improvement, which noted but did 
not investigate the reasons for these differences in depth, stated that “there may be reasons for this 
variation associated with difficulties in recruiting staff and difference in culture and attitude”
 .
11  
   
We have examined whether there is evidence that pay accounts for some of the differences in 
performance between trusts. We find that the pay relativity, between what the average nurse is paid and 
what she might get in the private sector, is negatively associated with achieving over one quarter of the 
individual targets in the star ratings and the specific patterns of association across targets broadly 
supports our hypothesis. There is a negative relationship with the 2001 target for nursing vacancies and 
the Qualified Allied Health Professionals target. Staff targets for which nurses’ relative pay is less 
likely to be important (e.g. consultancy vacancies and compliance with junior doctors hours) were 
either not significantly associated, or were positively associated with the pay variable. There is a 
surprising positive association between the staff absences target in 2002 and the private sector 
premium, though this may reflect the use of agency staff in hospitals short of permanent staff. Many of 
the targets based on patient surveys are negatively related to the pay premium. Patient experiences are 
likely to depend, to a large extent, on their contact with nursing staff.
12 The fact that these outcomes are 
rated as better where staff are paid relatively more points to a link between the ratings and pay.  
   7 
In contrast, other than a weak association with size, none of the other characteristics of hospitals or 
measures of population need appeared to be systematically related to the ratings. This echoes recent 




Low pay may lead to problems with both staff quantity and quality. In an attempt to disentangle 
quantity and quality we re-ran the regressions on each individual target including an extra control 
variable, the number of nurses (the head count of qualified nurses on 30
th September 1999). The results 
were very similar to those reported above, suggesting that the effect on performance may not be from 
numbers of nursing staff but from the knock-on effect of low quality staff, which could include low 
retention, low quality and low morale and the greater use of agency staff. In support of this, two recent 
studies have found a higher proportion of agency nurses is associated with lower patient satisfaction 
and lower star ratings.
14,15 
 
All performance measures tend to be subject to controversy over their possible accuracy.
 16, 17 Is this 
likely to bias our results? Smith has catalogued an extensive set of responses of health professionals to 
performance targets, some of which weaken the relationship between true and reported performance 
and some of which distort actual performance.
18 It is possible that the NHS star ratings are distorted by 
actions at more than one level: firstly by managers or clinicians seeking to do well and secondly to 
achieve political aims. Managers will focus on those targets they know they can achieve. The 
weighting of individual targets in the calculation of a single star rating may (and has) changed over 
time. Such manipulation may reduce the value of the overall ratings as an indicator of performance. 
This will mean analysis of the overall ratings is less likely to show any systematic relationship to a 
factor such as pay relativity which is beyond an individual manager’s control. However, we would 
expect it to weaken less the relationship between an individual target and the pay variable: a manager 
who has good staffing conditions may well focus on achieving the targets where her pay advantage can 
be used to its fullest.  
 
In conclusion, the implications of these results is that some of the performance of NHS trusts may be 
less related to managerial ability than to the labour market in which the trust is located. This, in turn, 
suggests that greater flexibility of pay at regional level may be one way to improve the performance of 
the NHS.    8 
Data Appendix 
 
To construct the pay relativities for each local labour market, data on pay in different geographical 
labour markets was taken from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
19.  The LFS is a continuous, household 
survey, conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The LFS has been running since spring 
1992 in its present form although a LFS has been carried out in the UK since 1973. Until 2000 there 
was both an annual local area LFS and a quarterly LFS. We use both. The annual local area LFS has 
data at a very detailed local area: data is available by 354 local authorities. However, the annual local 
area LFS has no detailed breakdown for occupation, containing only data by the broad categories of 
industry sector.   The quarterly LFS, on the other hand, has an occupation variable but is more 
aggregated on a geographical basis: the geographical unit of observation is government office region.       
 
For our measure of private pay, we used the annual local area LFS for 1999 (the latest year available). 
From this we extracted data on private sector pay, at the county/unitary authority level (of which there 
are 149), for females with comparable qualifications and part time/full time status to nurses. From the 
quarterly LFS 43% of nurses have some (as distinct from none) educational qualifications that are 
below NVQ4 and work full time (defined as over 30 hours per week). We restricted the group of 
private sector occupations to those that considered a reasonable alternative for an individual who had 
been working or might have wished to work as a nurse.    The occupations we included in this restricted 
definition of the private sector were managers, administrators, professional occupations, associated 
professional and technical occupations, clerical and secretarial occupations (we excluded those workers 
in public administration, health and education as these are predominantly public sector). Using the 
annual local area LFS, we constructed average gross hourly private sector pay at county/unitary 
authority level across the individuals with the same qualifications (some below NVQ4) and hours (full 
time and part time) as nurses.  (45% of nurses have the same set of qualifications but work part time. 
Analysis of the private sector pay of this group from the LFS indicated that the within region variation 
was greater than the between region variation. We therefore considered this variable to be unreliable.) 
 
To calculate nurses’ pay we considered female nurses only (1172 observations) and took data for those 
with highest qualification less than NVQ4 and who worked full time. This data is from the quarterly 
LFS, which has detailed occupational  information so that nurses can be identified in the sample. 
However, the quarterly LFS is at regional level, so our measure of nurses’ pay is at regional level. This 
is the appropriate level. There is no within-region variation in nurses’ wages as nurses’ pay is set 
nationally and is based on scales with certain grades. There is little scope for differences in nurses’ pay 
across regions (except for nurses working in London regions who were entitled to London allowance).   
(As we use data from 1999, the South East uplift is not relevant as it was not introduced until April 
2002.)   We computed the average gross hourly pay both for female nurses residing in London and for 
those living outside London i.e. 2 unique values of nurses’ average pay.    
 
From these two sources of data we constructed the pay ratio: the ratio of average private sector pay (at 
county/unitary authority level) to average nurses’ pay (at regional level). This varies across 
county/unitary authority. We linked the relevant pay variable to each acute trust in England by 
postcode (mapping by ArcView GIS 3.2). Each trust is assigned a value (not necessarily unique as two 
or more trusts may be located in the same county/unitary authority) for the relative pay ratio for nurses 
in their area. 
 
As a robustness check we also calculated the same pay ratio using 1998 data. The correlation between 
the two years of data is high (0.85), as we would expect as regional pay relativities change slowly. We 
use 1999 data here, but results using 1998 data are very similar. We also computed a pay gap variable: 
average gross hourly private sector pay minus average gross hourly nurses’ pay. Results using this 
measure were similar to those reported here.    9 






















Graph 2: Pay ratio (private premium) for full time 
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Table 1 Average 2001 and 2002 star ratings by government office region 
 
Government office region  Average star 
rating Sept 01 
Average star 
rating July 02 
Tyne & Wear  2.60  2.40 
Rest of North East  2.33  2.33 
Greater Manchester  1.91  1.80 
Merseyside  2.00  2.11 
Rest of North West  2.37  2.71 
South Yorkshire  2.00  2.33 
West Yorkshire  2.29  2.20 
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside  1.83  2.50 
East Midlands  2.63  2.14 
West Midlands Metropolitan  1.67  1.92 
Rest of West Midlands  1.89  1.60 
Eastern  2.50  2.00 
Inner London  1.85  2.47 
Outer London  1.64  1.60 
South East  1.30  1.72 
South West  2.06  1.83 
 
 
Table 2. Ordered probit analysis of star ratings 
 




























Sample size (number of trusts)  148  151 
Pseudo R
2  0.03  0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
~significant at 10%; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
   12 
Table 3. Coefficient on 1999 pay ratio for 2001 targets 
 
  Coeff. on 




2  n 
Key Targets:         
Total no. of patients waiting for an inpatient appointment  -3.24~  1.80  0.13  148 
Reduction in outpatient waiting (% of planned target achieved)  -2.0739~  1.0937  0.11  148 
% of patients waiting less than 2 weeks from urgent GP referral to outpatient 
appointment for suspected breast cancer 
0.8628  0.9445  0.01  148 
No. of patients waiting on trolleys for more than 12 hrs  -1.6520~  0.9689  0.08  148 
Operations cancelled on the day as a percentage of elective admissions  -0.2682  0.8258  0.01  148 
Commitment to improving Working Lives  All  hospitals hit target 
Hospital cleanliness (patient environment team inspection score)  -2.276~  1.2312  0.20  148 
         
Performance Targets:         
Percentage of patients waiting less than 6 months for an inpatient appointment 
at the end of Q4 
-2.5188*  1.0395  0.08  148 
Patients seen within 13 weeks of GP written referral for 1st outpatient 
appointment 
-0.2182  0.9942  0.12  148 
Trolley waits greater then 4 hours as a percentage of all non-elective 
admissions 
-1.2566  0.8581  0.12  148 
Resolution of written complaints (% completed within 4 weeks)  -0.9438  0.9209  0.07  148 
         
Clinical Targets:         
Clinical negligence:  level of compliance achieved against Clinical negligence 
scheme for Trusts risk management standards 
-2.4411*  1.2322  0.10  148 
Emergency readmission rates within 28 days of discharge (age and sex 
standardised) 
2.0147  1.8046  0.29  148 
Deaths in hospital within 30 days of surgery (non-elective admissions) (age 
and sex standardised) 
0.5112  1.1983  0.13  148 
         
Staff Targets:         
Sickness/absence rate for directly employed NHS staff  0.5469  0.9292  0.13  148 
Consultancy vacancy (3 month vacancy rate)  0.5661  0.9511  0.08  148 
Qualified nursing, midwifery and health visiting staff vacancy (3 mth vacancy 
rate) 
-3.680**  0.9146  0.14  148 
Qualified Allied Health Professionals (3 mth vacancy rate)  -0.6190  0.9205  0.04  148 
Compliance with the new deal on junior doctor's hrs 
 
1.7169~  0.9514  0.11  148 
Other independent variables included in each regression are those in Table 2 
Targets not analysed: no. of patients waiting more than 18 months for an inpatient appointment (99% of trusts hit 
target); financial performance against plan based on the provisional 2000/01 audited accounts (97% of trusts) hit 
target 
~significant at 10%; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Coefficient on 1999 pay ratio for 2002 targets 
 





2  N 
Key Targets:         
Number of patients waiting more than 12 hours for admission via A&E  -0.1251  0.1631  0.04  131 
Percentage of elective admissions cancelled at the last minute for non-clinical 
reasons 
-0.0626  0.9080  0.01  149 
Number of patients reported across the year as waiting more than 18 months for 
inpatient treatment 
1.28  1.39  0.08  151 
Whole hospital score for cleanliness, formulated against Patient Environment 
Action Team (PEAT) visits  
All hospitals hit target 
Progress towards achievement of Improving Working Lives (IWL) Standard 
‘practice status’ 
All hospitals hit target 
Percentage of patients seen within two weeks of urgent GP referral for 
suspected cancer to outpatient appointment with specialist 
0.0938  0.9458  0.02  139 
Achievement of financial balance in 2001/2 without unplanned financial 
support 
-0397  1.1789  0.16  151 
         
Performance Targets:         
Total time spent in A&E from arrival to admission, transfer or discharge  -4.173**  0.8573  0.10  131 
Wait from diagnosis to treatment for patients newly diagnosed with breast 
cancer 
-1.0317  0.9239  0.04  128 
Percentage of patients not admitted within one month of last minute 
cancellation 
-0.435  0.7824  0.01  149 
Percentage of patients whose discharge from hospital was delayed  -1.791*  0.7717  0.09  142 
Inpatient Survey – Coordination of care: Combined score of questions around 
organisation of emergency care, organisation of admissions process, staff 
giving conflicting information and members of staff taking overall charge of 
care. 
-2.786**  0.799  0.06  142 
Inpatient Survey – Environment and facilities: Combined score of questions 
around cleanliness and quality and amount of food provided. 
-3.455**  0.8205  0.10  142 
Inpatient Survey – Information and education: Combined score of questions 
around staff's responses to questions, explanations of medication and 
information about possible problems following transfer of care. 
-1.878*  0.7910  0.06  142 
Inpatient Survey – Physical and emotional needs: Combined score of questions 
around noise, adequate control of pain, assistance during mealtimes and 
discussions with staff about anxieties. 
-3.002**  0.8047  0.08  142 
Inpatient Survey – Prompt Access: Combined score of questions around length 
of waiting list, notice given of admission, change to admission date and 
waiting time to get to a ward through admission or A&E. 
-3.572**  0.8156  0.07  142 
Inpatient survey – Respect and dignity: Combined score of questions around 
privacy for discussion, examination and treatment, mixed sex facilities and 
whether patient was treated with dignity and respect 
-2.539**  0.7989  0.05  142 
Percentage of patients waiting less than 6 months for an inpatient admission  -1.6194*  0.7618  0.04  150 
Percentage of patients seen within 13 weeks of GP written referral for first 
outpatient Appointment 
-1.5739*  0.7529  0.02  146 
Total number of patients waiting for an inpatient appointment (% of planned 
target achieved) 
-0.2259  0.7533  0.02  151 
         
Clinical Targets         
Level of compliance against Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts risk 
Management standards  
-0.9597  0.9604  0.03  151 
Deaths within 30 days of a CABG, per 100,000patients (age, sex and method of 
admission standardised, includes deaths in hospital and after discharge) 
-4.9923  4.3062  0.40  24 
Deaths within 30 days of surgery for non-elective admissions to hospital, per 
100,000 patients (age and sex standardised, includes deaths in hospital and 
after discharge) 
-0.7349  0.8644  0.03  132 
Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days of discharge (all ages), as a 
percentage of live discharges (age and sex standardised) 
1.2055  0.9277  0.08  132   14 
Emergency readmissions of children to hospital within 7 days of discharge 
following medical treatment (ages 0-15), as a percentage of live discharges 
(age and sex standardised) 
1.3349  0.8662  0.04  128 
Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days of discharge following 
treatment for a fractured hip, as a percentage of live hip fracture discharges 
(age and sex standardised) 
-1.8422  1.2628  0.10  131 
Emergency readmissions to hospital within 28 days of discharge following a 
stroke, as a percentage of live stroke discharges (age and sex standardised) 
-2.6546*  1.2802  0.10  130 
Percentage of patients discharged back to usual place of residence within 56 
days of emergency admission to hospital with a stroke, all ages (age and sex 
standardised) 
-0.1747  1.1362  0.16  130 
Percentage of patients discharged back to usual place of residence within 28 
days of emergency admission to hospital with a hip fracture, all ages (age 
and sex standardised) 
0.1451  0.9120  0.03  130 
         
Staff Targets         
Summary measure of HES data quality for NHS trusts with inpatient activity  -0.3330  0.7591  0.06  151 
Percentage of Junior Doctors complying in full with the New Deal on Junior 
Doctors Hours 
-0.7218  0.7475  0.04  151 
Amount of time lost through absences as a percentage of staff time available for 
directly employed NHS staff (highest coded as poorest outcome) 
2.0913*  0.8206  0.09  140 
Responses from NHS-employed staff opinion survey on satisfaction with 
employer 
1.3914~  0.7771  0.02  142 
Achievement of information governance targets (Values range from 0 to 36)  0.0813  0.7533  0.01  151 
Other independent variables included in each regression are those in Table 2. 
Targets not analysed: Number of patients waiting more than 15 months for an inpatient admission (96% of trusts 
reached target); number of patients waiting more than 6 months (26 weeks) for an outpatient appointment (99% of 
trusts) reached target; Number of patients waiting more than 12 months for a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 
and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA). 
~significant at 10%; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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